Introduction

Most organisations already know what integrity is supposed to look like.

They have policies. They issue codes of conduct. They conduct training. They establish reporting channels. They communicate values. Senior management makes statements about zero tolerance for corruption and unethical conduct.

Yet the existence of these measures does not necessarily tell us whether people behave differently.

That is where the discussion becomes more interesting.

The important empirical question is not whether organizations should have integrity measures. That question has largely been answered. The harder question is whether these measures actually influence behaviour, through what mechanisms they do so, and under what conditions they are more or less effective.

This distinction matters because corruption and unethical conduct are ultimately behavioural phenomena. A policy sits on paper. A training session takes place at a particular time. A value may be printed on a wall. An article may be read in the LinkedIn. The decision to compromise, however, is made by a person facing a particular situation, often under pressure from targets, relationships, hierarchy, convenience, expectations or perceived organisational norms.

Recent empirical research provides useful evidence about what happens between the existence of an integrity measure and the behaviour that follows. The findings are not always comfortable. Some interventions appear to have limited effects. Others work through specific organisational or psychological mechanisms. Some appear to influence one type of behaviour but not another.

This article attempts to dissect that evidence.

The purpose is not to propose another integrity programme. It is to examine what recent research tells us about the conditions under which integrity measures may actually become behaviour.

When a Better Policy Does Not Necessarily Produce Better Behaviour

One of the clearest recent pieces of evidence comes from Köbis et al. (2026).

Their field experiment was conducted among employees of a globally operating, European headquartered technology company listed on NASDAQ. A total of 1,543 employees began the study and 1,235 successfully completed it. Employees were randomly exposed to different versions of an anti-bribery policy: a traditional 19-page policy, a shorter policy, an infographic-based version, or a control condition.

The researchers did not simply ask whether employees liked the policy. They examined rule knowledge, perceived social norms and behaviour through an incentivised bribery game.

The result was striking.

None of the policy formats significantly improved rule knowledge or reduced corrupt behaviour compared with the control condition. Nor were meaningful differences found between the different policy formats (Köbis et al., 2026).

This does not mean that policies are unnecessary. It means something more precise.

Changing the format of a policy is not the same as changing behaviour.

The study also provides an important clue about what may matter instead. Employees form beliefs about organisational norms and use those beliefs when making decisions in situations involving corruption risk.

For organisations, this raises a more difficult question than whether employees have received or read the policy:

What do employees actually believe people like them are expected to do when the rules become inconvenient?

That question takes us from formal communication to social norms.

What Employees See May Matter More Than What Employees Are Told

Rabl et al. (2026) examined another part of the equation: employee support for corruption prevention.

The study involved employees in Germany from different organisations and industries. The final sample comprised 147 participants, with 47 percent working in for profit organisations and 35 percent holding leadership positions. Through an experimental vignette design, participants assessed different organisational situations involving corruption prevention.

The researchers examined the influence of organisational ethical context and employee moral attentiveness.

Their findings indicated that compliance and value oriented programmes were positively associated with employee support for corruption prevention. More importantly, top management support mattered, with role modelled support showing stronger effects than support communicated only through written statements (Rabl et al., 2026).

The implication should not be exaggerated into the claim that leadership behaviour solves corruption.

It does, however, suggest an important mechanism.

Employees do not encounter organisational values only through formal communication. They encounter them through what people with authority actually do.

A senior executive who speaks about integrity but accepts an exception for an important customer sends a different message from one who applies the same standard when the commercial consequences are uncomfortable.

The difference is not merely rhetorical.

It changes the information employees receive about what the organisation really values.

There May Be No Single Corporate Ethical Culture

This becomes even more significant when we look at the research of Cabana and Kaptein (2026).

Their research is particularly valuable because it moves the analysis below the level of the organisation as a whole.

In their first study, conducted within a private online travel company in the United Kingdom, 1,378 employees were analysed across 180 teams. In their second study, involving four sister companies in the online travel industry, 4,040 employee responses were analysed across 590 teams, covering employees working across more than 20 countries.

The researchers examined ethics programme components including codes of ethics, ethics officers, ethics helplines and ethics training, together with dimensions of team ethical culture.

Importantly, unethical behaviour was examined through reported observations of unethical behaviour by team members during the previous 12 months rather than simply asking employees whether they personally behaved unethically.

The findings showed that different ethics programme components were associated with different dimensions of team ethical culture. The pathways to unethical behaviour also differed across teams and organisations. In the first study, congruency of management was negatively associated with unethical behaviour. In the second, feasibility and sanctionability were negatively associated with unethical behaviour (Cabana & Kaptein, 2026).

This finding deserves particular attention.

A large organisation may have one corporate code, one integrity statement and one formal ethics programme. Employees, however, do not experience the organisation as an abstract entity.

They experience it through their immediate manager, colleagues, targets, routines and local expectations.

The ethical environment of a procurement team may therefore be experienced differently from that of a sales team. A project team under intense delivery pressure may interpret organisational priorities differently from a support function.

This does not mean that organisations have no common culture.

It means that the organisational culture experienced by employees can have important team level dimensions.

For senior management, the implication is significant. An integrity programme cannot be assessed only from headquarters. The question is also what happens where decisions are actually made.

The Psychological Problem: People Can Act Unethically for the Organisation

There is another uncomfortable dimension to the evidence.

Not all unethical behaviour is committed against an organisation. Sometimes people behave unethically because they believe they are helping it.

Liu et al. (2026) conducted a meta-analysis covering 410 studies and 140,808 observations on unethical pro-organisational behaviour.

Their findings indicate that organisational attraction orientation and organisational stress orientation were positively associated with unethical pro-organisational behaviour. Organisational identification mediated the relationship involving attraction orientation, while moral disengagement mediated the relationship involving stress orientation.

This matters because it challenges a simple assumption about integrity.

An employee may not necessarily think:

“I am doing something wrong for my own benefit.” The reasoning may instead be:

·       “I am protecting the company.”

· “I am helping the team.”

· “Everyone expects this.”

· “If I do not do it, we will lose the business.”

· “The customer will go elsewhere.”

·       “Management wants results.”

The behaviour may therefore be inconsistent with formal organisational values while being psychologically consistent with the employee's perception of organisational loyalty.

This is one reason why integrity cannot be reduced to knowledge of rules.

The person may know the rule. The person may even believe in the rule. The difficulty arises when another organisational objective appears to compete with it.

Social Norms Can Become More Important Than Formal Rules

The role of social norms is also evident beyond the corporate environment.

Agerberg (2022), using two studies involving a total of 5,258 respondents in Mexico, examined perceptions of corruption norms. The research found that individuals could personally disapprove of corruption while simultaneously holding pessimistic beliefs about the behaviour of others. In the experimental component, correcting these misperceptions improved perceived norms and reduced reported willingness to engage in bribery.

The setting was the general population rather than employees, so the finding should not be transferred directly to corporate organisations.

It nevertheless illustrates an important behavioural mechanism. People may distinguish between what they personally believe and what they think other people believe. That gap can matter.

An employee may personally regard a particular practice as wrong but believe that colleagues, competitors or senior management expect it.

The perceived norm can therefore become a behavioural signal.

This helps explain why a formal statement of values can have limited effect when employees observe a different pattern in everyday organisational life.

One Intervention May Change One Behaviour but Not Another

The evidence also warns against judging integrity interventions too broadly.

Falisse and Leszczynska (2022) conducted a lab in the field experiment involving 527 public servants in Burundi, with a core analytical sample of 492. Participants were exposed to different messages, including a standard good governance message and a professional identity message.

The professional identity message improved fairness in the allocation of rationed vouchers. However, none of the messages changed participants' propensity to accept bribes.

The distinction is important. An intervention can influence one ethical decision while leaving another unchanged.

That means an organisation should be cautious about statements such as “the integrity programme worked” unless it is clear what behaviour actually changed.

A reduction in one form of unethical conduct does not automatically demonstrate a reduction in corruption generally.

Behaviour Change Also Depends on the Surrounding Environment

Evidence from Tanzania provides another useful illustration.

Camargo et al. (2025) examined a behaviour change intervention addressing bribery related social norms in a regional referral hospital in Dar es Salaam. The research included 1,192 hospital user exit survey responses across baseline and endline measurements, together with interviews involving users and staff.

The study reported a reduction in gift offering propensity from 23 percent at baseline to 13 percent at endline. Enabling norms and enabling attitudes also declined. Actual gift offering on the day measured in the study declined from 3 percent to 1 percent.

The distinction between these measures matters. The reduction in gift offering propensity should not be presented as a 44 percent reduction in actual bribery.

What the study does demonstrate is that behaviour change interventions can influence behavioural intentions, perceived norms and observed behaviour differently.

Again, the lesson is measurement. If organisations want to know whether integrity measures work, they need to decide what “work” actually means.

What Does the Malaysian Evidence Add?

The Malaysian literature provides an important contextual layer.

Abdul Jabar et al. (2026) examined corporate integrity practices from an institutional perspective through a qualitative case study of a Malaysian government owned company. The study found that institutional pressures, including government enforcement, influenced the adoption of corporate integrity practices. Environmental and individual norms, together with imitation, also influenced the continuation of integrity practices.

This is important because it shows that integrity initiatives do not emerge in an organisational vacuum.

External expectations matter.

However, external pressure should not be confused with internal ethical commitment. Institutional pressure can encourage an organisation to establish a mechanism. It does not by itself demonstrate that employees have internalised the underlying values.

A related 2026 doctoral study by Abdul Jabar examined corporate integrity practices and value creation across two Malaysian government owned companies. The research considered the role of Integrity and Governance Units and examined how integrity practices were connected with broader EESG related value creation.

The case evidence is useful, but it does not justify a universal claim that integrity practices cause superior financial performance. The study is better understood as evidence about how organisations perceive and organise integrity practices in relation to broader organisational value.

That distinction is important. The purpose of integrity should not be reduced to a promise of higher profit.

At the same time, integrity should not be treated as something unrelated to business.

Integrity and the Quality of Organisational Decisions

The private sector relevance becomes clearer when integrity is connected to ordinary business decisions.

Procurement decisions affect supplier quality and cost. Sales decisions affect customer expectations. Reporting decisions affect the quality of information available to management. Target setting affects the behaviour employees believe is expected. Customer service decisions affect trust and retention. Project decisions affect cost, quality, safety and delivery.

In each case, integrity is present before a corruption offence occurs.

This is an important distinction. The business question is not simply:

“Did someone commit an offence?”

It is also:

“What quality of decision making does the organisation produce when people face pressure?”

That is where integrity becomes relevant to business performance without requiring the unsupported claim that integrity automatically produces higher profits.

The relationship can be understood more carefully as:

integrity environment → decision and behaviour quality → operational and service quality → customer outcomes → potential business sustainability

The empirical literature does not establish a universal causal chain across all these stages. It does, however, provide evidence for several links within it.

For example, Lau et al. (2017), studying 200 employees across six shopping malls in Kuala Lumpur, found relationships between ethical work climate, organisational politics, affective commitment and proactive customer service performance. Ethical climate had direct relationships with organisational politics, affective commitment and proactive customer service performance.

This provides a useful Malaysian private sector example of how an ethical environment can intersect with customer facing behaviour.

Again, the evidence does not establish that ethical climate increases profit. It shows something more immediate.

The ethical environment in which employees work can be connected with how employees behave towards customers.

That is already a meaningful business outcome.

Integrity, Accountability and the Malaysian Context

The Malaysian evidence also suggests that integrity has consequences beyond corruption prevention.

Yahya et al. (2022) examined 194 top management respondents from Malaysian statutory bodies and reported a positive and significant relationship between corporate integrity practices and organisational accountability.

This is an association, not experimental evidence of causation.

Nevertheless, it supports an important proposition: integrity mechanisms can be connected with organisational accountability rather than existing solely as anti-corruption instruments.

Zahari et al. (2022), using responses from 251 Malaysian government employees, similarly examined ethical culture and perceived corruption. Their findings identified supportability and sanctionability as influential factors in controlling perceived corruption.

The limitation is equally important. The study measured perceptions of ethical climate and perceived acts of fraud and bribery rather than recorded instances of corruption.

This distinction illustrates a broader problem in integrity research.

An organisation may have strong policies. Employees may report a positive ethical climate. Management may report confidence in the integrity programme.

None of these measures necessarily proves that unethical behaviour has fallen.

That is why measurement deserves more attention.

Leadership, Values and Institutionalisation

More recent Malaysian research adds another dimension.

Abdul Aziz et al. (2026) examined the implementation of HEMAT values in the Malaysian public sector through qualitative interviews with five senior federal officials. The study found that the framework was translated into organisational practices through leadership direction, organisational alignment and procedural reforms. Personal responsibility was reinforced through recognition, training and human resource interventions, while monitoring, digitalisation, enforcement and performance management supported prudential governance. The study also emphasised the importance of aligning ethical frameworks with organisational structures and management control systems.

The study is qualitative and based on a limited purposive sample of senior officials. It therefore provides insight into implementation rather than proof that HEMAT causes behavioural change.

Junus (2026) provides another Malaysian perspective by examining the relationship between ethical climate and integrity among officials at Universiti Utara Malaysia. The study used questionnaires distributed to 50 respondents and reported an association between ethical climate and integrity development. Because of its small sample and design, it should be treated as supporting evidence rather than definitive causal evidence.

Taken together, these Malaysian studies reinforce a theme that also appears in the international evidence.

Integrity is not sustained by a single intervention.

It is shaped by the interaction between formal systems, leadership, organisational expectations, individual judgement and the environment in which decisions are made.

Culture Is Not Simply a Matter of Values on the Wall

This brings us to the word that appears most frequently in discussions of integrity: culture.

Culture is often treated as though it were something an organisation can create simply by announcing a set of values.

The evidence suggests a more complicated reality.

Ross and Arnold (2026), in a review of 155 articles on organisational ethical culture, identify important conceptual and measurement problems in the literature. Their analysis highlights questions about what ethical culture actually means, at what organisational level it should be assessed and how different levels of analysis should be connected.

This matters because “culture” can become a convenient explanation for almost anything.

If an organisation experiences unethical conduct, it is easy to say that it has a poor culture. But what exactly does that mean? Does it refer to leadership behaviour? Team norms? Employee perceptions? Actual behaviour? Formal controls? Informal expectations? The ability to raise concerns? The consequences of misconduct?

Without specifying the mechanism, culture becomes difficult to measure and even more difficult to manage.

The evidence from Cabana and Kaptein (2026) is therefore particularly useful because it examines ethical culture at team level and connects different dimensions with different behavioural outcomes.

The lesson is not that every team needs a different ethics programme.

It is that organisations should understand where ethical expectations are being reinforced, weakened or contradicted.

So, What Should Organisations Actually Be Trying to Change?

The evidence reviewed here suggests that organisations should reconsider what they treat as evidence of integrity.

A policy can be completed without changing behaviour. A training programme can be delivered without changing behaviour. A value can be communicated without changing behaviour. An integrity unit can exist without demonstrating behavioural impact.

None of these observations makes the underlying measure unnecessary. It means the measure should not be mistaken for the outcome. For organisations, four questions therefore become particularly important.

First, are employees clear about the expected standard?

Köbis et al. (2026) suggest that policy communication alone may not be sufficient. Organisations need to understand whether employees know not only what the rule says, but what the organisation actually expects when circumstances become difficult.

Second, do employees believe that the expected standard is real?

Rabl et al. (2026) and the wider evidence on social norms suggest that written statements are only part of the message. Leadership conduct and observed behaviour can communicate what the organisation really tolerates.

Third, does the immediate working environment reinforce the standard?

Cabana and Kaptein (2026) show why team level ethical culture deserves attention. Employees experience integrity through everyday relationships and decisions, not only through corporate headquarters.

Fourth, can the organisation demonstrate behavioural change?

This may be the most difficult question. The evidence suggests that organisations should distinguish between measuring inputs and measuring outcomes.

Inputs include:

policy issuance, training completion, communications, reporting mechanisms and organisational structures.

Outcomes include:

employee understanding, perceived norms, decision quality, observed unethical behaviour, customer facing conduct, accountability and other measurable behavioural indicators.

The distinction is fundamental.

An organisation should not confuse doing integrity activities with achieving integrity outcomes.

What This Means for the Private Sector

For a CEO, the issue is ultimately not academic. Every organisation operates under pressure. There are revenue targets. There are deadlines. There are difficult customers. There are strategic suppliers. There are relationships that matter. There are employees who want to protect their teams. There are managers who want to deliver results.

There are situations where doing the right thing may appear slower, more expensive or commercially inconvenient.

Those are precisely the situations in which culture becomes visible.

A strong integrity environment does not mean that employees will never face ethical pressure.

It means the organisation has created conditions in which employees can recognise the pressure, understand the expected standard, make an appropriate decision and believe that doing so will not place them at a disadvantage for acting with integrity.

This is where integrity moves beyond compliance.

The objective is not merely to prevent the organisation from becoming legally liable.

The deeper objective is to create an organisational environment in which sound decisions are more likely to be made before misconduct becomes a legal problem, financial problem, operational problem or customer problem.

That is a much broader governance objective.

The Real Test of an Integrity Culture

The evidence reviewed in this article points towards a common pattern.

Rules matter. Policies matter. Training matters. Structures matter. But their effectiveness depends on what happens around them. Employees interpret organisational signals. They observe leaders. They form perceptions about colleagues. They respond to team norms.

They rationalise decisions. They assess whether ethical conduct is feasible. They consider whether misconduct will be tolerated or sanctioned. They decide what to do when organisational objectives collide with personal or ethical judgement.

That is the space between an integrity programme and actual behaviour.

And that is where the empirical question becomes most valuable.

Instead of asking only:

“Do we have an integrity programme?”

organisations should increasingly ask:

“What behaviour is this programme changing?”

And then:

“How do we know?”

Scope and Limitation

This article has deliberately adopted an empirical rather than a legal or standards-based approach. It therefore does not examine or assess any Malaysian Act, circular, administrative direction or other domestic regulatory instrument, nor does it evaluate ISO 37001:2025 or MS 2764:2022. This is a deliberate limitation of scope, rather than an assertion that these instruments are unimportant.

The purpose here is narrower: to examine what empirical research tells us about how integrity measures translate, or fail to translate, into organisational behaviour in promoting integrity culture.

The studies reviewed also differ substantially in methodology, population, setting and outcome measures. Some examine actual or incentivised behaviour, while others examine perceptions, attitudes, organisational practices or qualitative accounts. The findings should therefore be read as evidence about particular mechanisms and contexts, rather than as proof of a single universal model of integrity or corruption prevention.

AI Disclosure

Artificial intelligence (AI or as was noted recently in as being renamed to SI, Super Intelligence) was used as a supporting tool during the preparation of this article, principally for literature identification and organisation, checking of publicly available source information, language refinement, grammar, readability and presentation. The conceptual framing, research questions, selection of the issues examined, interpretation of the evidence, arguments, flow and preference of argument and conclusions are the author's own. AI was not used to determine the substantive position or conclusions of the article. The author reviewed and verified the sources relied upon and retains full responsibility for the accuracy, interpretation and final content of the article.

Contribution and Approval

This article was contributed by the Biro Penerangan, Association of Certified Integrity Officers Malaysia (ACeIO), as reviewed and approved by the President of ACeIO on 6th October 2026. The contribution forms part of the Association's efforts to promote a culture of integrity and anti-corruption and to support corruption prevention. The ACeIO calls for all members of the association to contribute insights via sharing their reflection on the various aspect of integrity and anti-corruption.

Conclusion

So, what does it really take to promote a culture of integrity and prevent corruption?

The evidence does not point to another policy, another training session or another communication campaign as the answer. Those measures have a role, but their effect depends on the environment in which employees interpret and apply them.

The recent evidence points repeatedly towards leadership behaviour, social norms, team culture, institutional expectations and the way employees rationalise decisions. The Malaysian studies published in 2026 add another important point: formal integrity mechanisms are shaped by institutional pressures, leadership direction, organisational structures and informal norms.

For the private sector, this means that integrity should not be treated as something separate from business operations. It is present in procurement, customer dealings, reporting, target setting, supplier relationships and management decisions.

The relevant question is therefore not simply whether these activities comply with the rules. It is whether the organisation creates conditions in which people can make sound decisions when the pressure to compromise appears.

Promoting a culture of integrity therefore requires more than telling people what the rules are.

The organisation has to make the expected standard clear, demonstrate it through leadership, reinforce it through everyday decisions and systems, and examine whether behaviour changes in practice.

The strongest test may come at the point where integrity competes with convenience, relationships, targets or commercial pressure. That is where the culture of an organisation becomes visible.

And that is where corruption prevention (or mitigation as preferred by the author) either becomes real or remains largely on paper.

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